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Book Review 
Julia Kristeva, The Severed Head: Capital Visions (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011) 
It can hardly have escaped Julia Kristeva that her 2011 study The Severed 
Head: Capital Visions enacts its contents, so to speak, at the level of its literary 
form. I mean by this that the book – a short study of artistic, cultural and 
political uses of severed heads – evokes the notion of a “severed text” on (at 
least) three distinct levels of association. First, there is the metaphorical 
sense in which all texts are severed objects, lopped off from the bodies of 
thought that produce them1; second, there is the banal sense in which one 
places the book, repository of knowledge, on a shelf like a trophy; and 
finally – most interesting of all – there is the sense in which Kristeva’s text is 
an instance of the very “decapitation-representation” that it explores. More 
precisely, it can be read without difficulty as an enactment of the human 
psychological/philosophical drama of skull and face worship that, for 
Kristeva, indicates certain “significant anthropological constants” (11).  
To say as much is to believe that The Severed Head does what it 
describes, which is to say, mitigates melancholy and death. This it does 
through hiving off a piece of (over-determined) reality, the human head and 
face, as representation. But this speaks to what I believe is the text’s central, 
substantive and most interesting claim – that representations of severed 
heads, paradoxically, emerge from an overcoming of death through 
representation, and are therefore – though in some ways remaining 
profoundly ambivalent – more life-affirming than not. Kristeva notes that in 
the period before the very young child acquires language, she goes through 
a transitory period of profound melancholy (5). This feeling develops 
alongside the realization of the gratuity and impermanence of the mother, 
i.e. the loss of maternal dependence. The child begins to represent the lost 
mother through language; begins to imagine/dream/represent her face and 
skull, “primary targets of the gaze”, thus “privileged stations in the loss of 
maternal dependence” (16). For Kristeva, “most of us replace the absent face, 
as loved as it is feared, source of joy and terror with … a representation” (5). 
As she eloquently puts it, “… grieving is dependent on sublimation. Have 
we really fathomed how grief and melancholy line the underside of our 
languages, our so-called mother tongues?” (6). Thus The Severed Head begs 
an engagement with Kristeva’s earlier and more substantial Black Sun: 
Depression and Melancholia (1989). Her brief clinical sketch explaining the 
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historically pervasive fixation on heads and faces opens fascinating lines of 
inquiry; for example, the rooting of grieving in sublimation also lends itself 
to a language-based typology of developmental pathologies. By way of 
example, Kristeva briefly explores the case of the autistic child, who “eludes 
language” (16).   
Kristeva’s “clinical” thesis thus grounds a text which otherwise 
suffers, at points, from being ill-adapted from its original purpose, which 
was to curate a gallery showing (we are told unhelpfully at times to refer to 
unspecified video loops). It is, precisely, the wonderful levity with which 
Kristeva moves from topic to topic – certainly fitting for a commentary on a 
gallery showing – that does not do justice to this substantive, philosophical 
core of the work. Her meditations on capital visions bring us from pre-
historical evidence of cranial manipulations and skull worship through 
Medusa representations and the logic of the religious icon, to decapitations 
and figures of biblical women, the spectacle of the guillotine, modern 
televisual representations of decapitations and finally, the push for 
“acephalous” thought in the Twentieth Century. Throughout, Kristeva 
maintains her central thesis: that human obsession with the severed head in 
representations and in ritual stems not only from the anthropological, pre-
historical “cradle of humanity” (to evoke Bataille, who appears late in the 
text), but also from the early development of the individual ego. The way 
that Kristeva moves through the history of capital representations evokes 
the expansiveness of a textual introduction by Hegel. This is its virtue and 
its flaw; just as the joints of Hegel’s system often seem a little too tidy, 
Kristeva’s text gives the impression of moving effortlessly precisely where 
one would expect more friction.  
Indeed, Kristeva’s text is profoundly Hegelian (naturally, one 
might argue, since it is Freudian). This could indicate an interpretation of its 
silence with respect to the post-Lacanian philosophy of desire which had its 
moment during what she calls the “Belle Epoque” (89) of the French 1970s. 
Though she gives precursors Bataille and Acéphale their due in the final 
chapter, there is no discussion of the genuine (though genuinely 
paradoxical) attempt of some of Kristeva’s then-contemporaries to launch a 
truly “headless” thought, denying the critical distance implied by the 
Hegelian labour of the negative (I am thinking here of Deleuze and Guattari, 
Lyotard). Such attempts should have been doubly interesting to Kristeva, to 
the extent that they drew considerable inspiration from both Bataille and 
from Freud’s pulsional theory. This silence – but also her designation of this 
“Belle Epoque”, this wistful irony – might be read symptomatically. Is The 
Severed Head a triumphalist text? A recuperation of the death of the king, the 
structure absorbing the thinking which strains to escape it? A working-
through, or perhaps, in spite of Kristeva’s best intentions, at points a 
fetishistic disavowal? Like any good Hegelian text, The Severed Head draws 
us into a search for the other members of the corpus. Taken on its own it is 
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monstrous, an image of the abjected head in search of a body; but for this 
reason it speaks to the philosophy of recuperation, the tough optimism that 
is always detectable at the bottom of Kristeva’s meditations on the darkest of 
subjects.  
Matthew R. McLennan 
University of Ottawa/Carleton University 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1 The connection of the written work to excrement may also be made according to a 
Freudian symbolic economy. See Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, 182-183 
for a discussion of the excremental character of the work, in connection with Freud 
and Artaud (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
